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EXPLOITING THE ENEMY IN THE ORKNEYS: THE
EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR ON
THE SCAPA FLOW BARRIERS DURING THE SECOND
WORLD WAR
JOHANN CUSTODIS
The British naval base at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys played a vital role during the
Second World War for the Allied war effort. It housed the British Home Fleet
and provided a strategic military base for Allied operations in the North Sea,
Atlantic and the Arctic. Although Scapa Flow’s military history is well served, the
barriers built by Italian prisoners of war (POWs) to strengthen its defences in the
early war years have received little attention.1 Britain faced a peculiar dilemma
in the Orkneys: defences needed to be fortified given Scapa Flow’s key location
and military role, but manpower was extremely scarce. Civilians were reluctant
to work on the islands due to harsh and dangerous working conditions. Since
efforts to attract them via compulsion and bonus schemes, and to employ migrant
workers were insufficient, the government employed 1,200 Italian POWs instead,
despite the scheme’s doubtful legality under the Geneva Convention. This article
examines the history and significance of the Italians’ employment in the Orkneys
and demonstrates that their contribution was vital for the construction of the
Churchill barriers. Previous studies have neglected the multiple strikes by the
prisoners and their protests against illegal work and some wrongly assume that
the prisoners were not participating in the construction of the barriers. This article
explicitly examines the legality issue and the prisoners’ extensive employment.
Although their employment violated the Geneva Convention, British authorities
and neutral delegates deemed it legal, thus securing the barriers’ completion.
1 Stephen W. Roskill, The War at Sea (3 vols, London, HMSO, 1956); W. S. Hewison, This Great
Harbour Scapa Flow (Stromness, The Orkney Press, 1985); W. S. Hewison, Scapa Flow in War and Peace
(Kirkwall, Bellavista, 1995).
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Employment of Italian POWs on the Scapa Flow Barriers
Scholars examining the Churchill barriers have tended to focus on the barriers
as engineering features or as naval defence mechanisms.2 Popular histories mostly
look at the Italian chapel built by the prisoners and romanticise their employment
and living conditions. Amateur historian James MacDonald presents the most
detailed account, describing POW working and living conditions through
eyewitness reports of British soldiers and Orcadians. He occasionally supplements
his account with information from the secondary literature.3 However, he relies
solely on one type of primary source material and only presents anecdotal
employment evidence which does not reveal the arduous nature of the work
undertaken. This article complements his account. It examines new qualitative
and quantitative evidence on POW living and working conditions, wages and
output from International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) camp reports
and British government files from the National Archives. Newspaper coverage of
the Orkney prisoners completes the picture. The result is the most comprehensive
account yet provided of the employment and living conditions of Italian POWs
in the Orkneys.
This article is solely devoted to the study of the Italians’ role in building the
barriers during the war. It provides the historical context for the role of Italian
POW labour in Britain and the reasons for the construction of the Churchill
barriers. The analysis of civilian labour in the Orkneys and the prisoners’
employment and living conditions illustrates that the government depended on
prisoner labour and that the current literature mostly understates the arduous
employment conditions and the extent of their labour exploitation. The legality of
their employment in light of the 1929 Geneva Convention will also be examined
here. Italian POW employment at Scapa violated the Convention, but the
British government convinced the prisoners, the Protecting Power and the Red
Cross that their employment was legal. This article will conclude that Britain’s
behaviour was in line with the so-called retaliation concept. Italian POWs filled a
vital manpower gap by supplying skilled and unskilled labour for the erection
of military barriers. In turn, the government undertook various measures to
maintain the POW labour supply, to increase it, and to maximise its productivity.
I
Bob Moore has found that labour economics played a key role in British
policy on Italian POWs and that the British war economy benefited from their
employment.4 At the war’s peak, approximately 152,600 Italian POWs were
2 For the engineering perspective see James Abercrombie Seath, ‘Causeways Closing the Eastern
Entrances to Scapa Flow’, The Institution of Civil Engineers, Maritime and Waterways Engineering Division,
Maritime Paper No. 5, Session 1945–46, pp. 24–65.
3 James MacDonald, Churchill’s Prisoners: The Italians in the Orkneys 1942–1944 (Kirkwall,
Orkney, MacDonald, 1987), p. 1.
4 Bob Moore, ‘The Importance of Labour: the Western Allies and their Italian POWs in World
War II’, Annali dell’Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento, 28 (2002), p. 531; Bob Moore, ‘Turning
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working in Britain in August 1945.5 They had been transferred from the Middle
East, India and Africa between 1941 and 1944 to ease manpower shortages.6 Italy’s
armistice in September 1943 rendered the future of the Italian POW status and
their labour supply uncertain. The provisional Italian government finally agreed
in April 1944 on its ‘co-belligerency’ status. Italian POWs could now choose
between becoming ‘co-operators’ or remaining ‘non-co-operators’. Co-operators
signed a declaration that they would be willing to perform work contrary
to the Geneva Convention such as loading ammunition for British troops.
They were organised in Italian labour units without British supervision and
benefited from higher minimum pay and free movement within a radius of two
miles from their camp, while non-co-operators remained in camps.7 However,
co-operator conversion rates remained far below government expectations and
non-co-operators frequently hardened their fascist views and refused to work.8
A revised package in August 1944, which increased the freedom of movement
and allowed cash payments and remittances to Italy, did not substantially increase
conversions. Lucio Sponza has found that the prisoners were mostly politically
indifferent and that their reluctance probably stemmed from confusion about
their ‘co-belligerent’ status.9 According to Sponza, the timely introduction of
the co-operator status was vital to gain additional labour supporting the D-Day
operation in summer 1944.10 In other words, Italian POWs in Britain indirectly
contributed to the Allied war effort. Neville Wylie has found that the Italians
were ultimately ‘more useful to Britain’s cause in the wheat fields than the
battlefields’.11 Scholars thus acknowledge the vital economic contribution Italian
POWs made to the British war effort. They were seen as ‘a source of malleable
labour who, with a modicum of effort, would willingly work for their captors’,
whereas German POWs were initially perceived as a serious security threat.12
Italians were considered less threatening than Germans.13 This changed after
the end of hostilities, when German POW labour was eventually used more
intensively and on a large scale. Germans replaced Italians upon repatriation in
Liabilities into Assets: British Government Policy towards German and Italian POWs in the Second
World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, 32, 1 (1997), p. 127.
5 The National Archives, London, [hereafter TNA], WO 165/59, Summary No. 51, August
1945.
6 Lucio Sponza, Divided Loyalties: Italians in Britain during the Second World War (Bern, Peter Lang,
2001), p. 194; Bob Moore, ‘Axis Prisoners in Britain during the Second World War’, in Bob Moore
and Kent Fedorowich (eds), POWs and their Captors in World War II (Oxford, Berg, 1996), p. 29.
7 Moore, ‘Axis Prisoners in Britain’, p. 33.
8 Sponza, Divided Loyalties, pp. 257, 271, 284; Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich, The British
Empire and its Italian prisoners of war 1940–47 (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002), pp. 159–60.
9 Lucio Sponza, ‘Italian POWs in Britain, 1943–46’, in Moore and Fedorowich, POWs,
pp. 213–15.
10 Sponza, Divided Loyalties, p. 211.
11 Neville Wiley, ‘Prisoners of War in the Era of Total War’, War in History, 13, 2 (2006), p. 224.
12 Moore and Fedorowich, The British Empire, p. 67.
13 Ibid., p. 162.
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December 1945 and provided a vital contribution to Britain’s post-war economy,
with a peak of over 350,000 POW workers in summer 1946.14
The 1929 Geneva Convention in force during World War Two stipulated
minimum POW maintenance and employment conditions and Britain and
the Commonwealth abided by these rules very closely.15 The ICRC as an
independent intermediary regularly inspected POW camps around the globe to
check adherence to the Convention. Moore finds that Western powers maintained
the Convention’s basic elements during the war, ‘albeit with some bending
of the rules when it suited their purpose’.16 Conversely, Russia, Japan and
Germany mostly ignored it.17 Historians and legal scholars have debated the
determinants for adherence. Morrow regards adherence to treatment standards
as costly, making it tempting to cheat, for instance, through employment abuse.
Still, the Convention presented a ‘workable solution to strategic problems’.18
However, S. Paul MacKenzie argues that it was not the legal framework but
rather the credible retaliation threats which induced adherence to the Convention
during World War Two.19 The retaliation concept implies that enemy POWs were
treated well by the captor to guarantee adequate treatment for his POWs in enemy
hands.20 Bruno Frey and Heinz Buhofer offer an economic interpretation of the
retaliation concept. The costs and benefits of violation and of maintaining POWs
determine POW treatment standards for the captor irrespective of humanitarian
rules.21
Moore provides several historical examples for the retaliation concept. The
harsh treatment of Germans in Allied hands after the end of hostilities suggests
that retaliation, and not international legal conventions, determined POW
treatment in enemy hands.22 British and American officials, for example, were
not concerned about the abuse of Axis POWs by the Free French as soon as
German retaliation was negligible.23 Similarly, the British were only ‘keen to
abide by the rules’ concerning Italian POWs so long as Italy possessed enough
14 Johannes-Dieter Steinert and Inge Weber-Newth, Labour and Love (Osnabrück, Secolo-Verlag,
2000), p. 33.
15 Rüdiger Overmans, Soldaten hinter Stacheldraht –Deutsche Kriegsgefangene des 2. Weltkriegs
(Munich, Oldenbourg, 2002), pp. 14, 83.
16 Bob Moore, ‘Unruly Allies: British Problems with the French Treatment of Axis POWs’, War
in History 7, 2 (2000), p. 197.
17 Russia and Japan had not ratified the Convention and Germany only respected it for British
and American POWs. B. Dear and D. Foot (eds), The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 340, 713.
18 James D. Morrow, ‘Institutional Features of POW Treaties’, International Organization, 55 (2001),
pp. 979–89.
19 S. P. MacKenzie, ‘The Treatment of POWs in World War II’, Journal of Modern History, 66, 3
(1994), p. 519.
20 Ibid., p. 503.
21 Bruno Frey and Heinz Buhofer, ‘Prisoners and Property Rights’, Journal of Law and Economics,
31, 1 (1988), pp. 41–3.
22 Moore, ‘Unruly Allies’, p. 180.
23 Moore, ‘The Importance of Labour’, p. 541.
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bargaining power to retaliate. However, Moore and Kent Fedorowich argue that
the Convention ‘was never severely breached’ by the British.24 The ‘tit for tat’
games between Britain and Germany illustrate the escalation of retaliation threats.
In response to alleged German POW mistreatment on board the Pasteur, as it was
en route from Suez to Canada, Germany retaliated with similar measures against
British POWs in September 1942. For Moore, this incident marks the end of a
‘gentleman’s war’ between Britain and Germany.25 Relations deteriorated even
further during the ‘shackling crisis’. Hitler ordered the shackling of British and
Canadian POWs to avenge the handcuffing of German POWs during the Allied
raid on Dieppe in October 1942. Britain and Germany subsequently shackled
an ever-increasing number of POWs until Germany finally ceased shackling in
November 1943.26 Italian POW employment in the Orkneys is analysed in light
of the retaliation debate. Britain’s bargaining power and efforts of officials on the
ground succeeded in retaining a workforce vital for a military project despite
protesting prisoners and infringements of the Convention.
II
Scapa Flow provided the principal strategic naval base for the British Home
Fleet during the Second World War. The Fleet guarded and controlled North
Sea waters and the passages to the Atlantic in the early stages of the war and
subsequently operated in the Arctic, Mediterranean and as far as Madagascar.
British and American battleships frequently used Scapa Flow as a base from 1941
onwards to hunt German battleships such as the Bismarck in the North Sea and
Atlantic and to support Allied convoys in Malta and the Atlantic.27 From 1943
onwards, Scapa Flow was used for training in invasion techniques, arranging
exercises and providing targets and anti-submarine protection while at sea. In June
1943, all heavy battleships and the Gibraltar fleet trained in naval bombardment
at Scapa Flow for the invasion of Sicily. Stephen Roskill values the training of
British and American ships at Scapa Flow and the port of Clyde for the invasion of
France even more highly. Both ports were extremely busy as ships practised coastal
bombardment by sea and defence against aircraft targets. Roskill claims that ‘there
is no doubt at all that those who laboured so long at Scapa, on the Clyde and at
other bases contributed greatly to the success of the invasion of France’.28 Thus
24 Moore and Fedorowich, The British Empire, p. 226.
25 Bob Moore, ‘Die letzte Phase des Ende des Gentleman-Krieges: Die Behandlung deutscher
Kriegsgefangener an Bord des britischen Truppenschiffs Pasteur im März 1942’, in Rüdiger
Overmans and Günther Bischof (eds), Kriegsgefangenschaft im 2. Weltkrieg-eine vergleichende Perspektive
(Ternitz, Höller, 1999), pp. 36–8.
26 David Rolf, “Blind Bureaucracy’: The British Government and POWs in German Captivity,
1939–45’, in Moore and Fedorowich (eds), POWs, p. 60.
27 Nathan Miller, War at Sea: a Naval History of the Second World War (New York, Scribner, 1995),
p. 148; Roskill, War at Sea, vol. iii, p.63.
28 Roskill, War at Sea, vol. iii, pp. 269–82.
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Scapa Flow represented the main harbour from which the British Home Fleet
undertook its military operations in the North Sea and the Arctic and its convoy
escort duties in the Atlantic, Arctic and Mediterranean. The harbour was also used
by Allied military ships, mostly American, and served as a vital training ground
for key military operations such as the invasion of Sicily and France. Scapa Flow
served three different purposes during the war. First, it played a key role in the
home defence strategy against a potential German invasion. Secondly, it housed
the Home Fleet during the war. Military operations in the North Sea, Atlantic
and Arctic were launched from this base. Thirdly, it provided a naval training
ground and was a key turnstile harbour for convoys and passenger ships.29
German U-boat U-47 entered Scapa Flow Bay on 14 October 1939,
torpedoed and sunk the British battleship the Royal Oak and escaped unharmed.
During the incident 833 British men died. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty,
stated in parliament that the U-Boat was able to enter the bay because of
insufficient barriers and a lack of patrol ships guarding the bay’s seven entry points
on the night of the incident.30 Two days after the sinking, a German air raid on
Scapa Flow significantly damaged the depot ship the Iron Duke. The entire fleet
was temporarily evacuated to HMNB Clyde and the War Cabinet considered
basing it at another harbour.31 While the Admiralty favoured the Clyde as a base,
Admiral Forbes himself rejected this move. He argued that Scapa Flow was closer
to the theatre of operations and better defended than the naval bases of Rosyth and
Clyde. Churchill agreed and in turn persuaded key Admiralty staff that Scapa Flow
was the optimal choice.32 Following Churchill’s advice, the War Cabinet agreed
on 1 November 1939 to keep the Home Fleet based at Scapa Flow.33 Churchill
stressed the need to strengthen the defences of Scapa Flow in parliament one week
later:
Measures had been taken, and were being taken, to improve the physical
obstructions, and the last blockship required reached Scapa Flow only the
day after the disaster had occurred. All the more it was necessary, while
these defences were incomplete, that the patrolling craft should have been
particularly numerous.34
Prior to the Fleet’s return to Scapa Flow in March 1940, additional anti-aircraft
and anti-submarine defences were installed as security measures.35 Churchill
29 MacDonald, Churchill’s Prisoners, p. 11.
30 Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons [hereafter PD Commons], 5th series, vol. 352 (1939),
col. 686.
31 Hewison, This Great Harbour, pp. 261–5.
32 Stephen W. Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals (London, Collins, 1977), p.118.
33 Hewison, This Great Harbour, p. 268.
34 PD Commons, vol. 353 (1939), col. 253.
35 Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, p. 268.
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mentioned that the Royal Oak episode ‘gave a shock to public opinion’.36 The
pressure permanently to secure Scapa Flow’s defences increased sharply in light of
the Royal Oak and Iron Duke incidents. William Hewison argues that given this
pressure, Churchill approved the construction of the barriers.37 The approval was
apparently granted after consultation with the Admiralty’s chief engineer in March
1940, upon the Fleet’s return to Scapa. Preliminary work began immediately, but
contractor Balfour Beatty only started the actual barrier construction in August
1941.38 At the end of 1942, the barriers were ‘submarine-proof ’; the first of the
four barriers was completed by August 1943 and the barriers’ overall completion
was achieved in September 1944.39 The roads connecting the islands were opened
on 12 May 1945 and are still in use today.40
III
Given its military significance, Scapa Flow was substantially fortified during the
war. Apart from its strategic location for defensive and offensive operations of the
Fleet, it also was a feasible target for the German Army. Situated just 300 miles
from German-occupied Norway, it represented a potential invasion target and was
within the range of German bombers. Scapa Flow was subject to sixteen German
air raids during the war.41 Consequently, the scale of facilities installed and
personnel brought onto the islands was highly significant. The Orkney Defence
Command was upgraded to a division of two brigades and placed under the
Major General’s command in 1940. At its peak in 1941, it housed 12,500 Navy
personnel and 30,000 soldiers. Including civilian workers and RAF personnel,
almost 50,000 men and women were living in the Orkneys. This represented a
major influx to the islands as only around 25,000 native Orcadians inhabited the
islands during the inter-war period. Apart from the harbour itself, two airfields for
two RAF squadrons, one underground oil storage facility, numerous anti-aircraft
and anti-naval gun batteries and a radar station had been installed or were under
construction by December 1940.42
However, the main resource to complete the fortifications –manpower –was
constantly lacking. Labour demand in the islands rose quickly in the early stages
of the war because of several simultaneous contracts for the Army, Navy and the
Air Force. At their peak, 3,700 civilians were employed on these works.43 Demand
generally exceeded supply, with an overall shortage of 2,300 workers in the
36 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 1, The Gathering Storm (London, Cassell, 1967),
p. 440.
37 Hewison, This Great Harbour, p. 306.
38 Ibid.
39 Hewison, Scapa Flow in War and Peace, p. 63; MacDonald, Churchill’s Prisoners, pp. 33, 44.
40 Hewison, This Great Harbour, p. 311.
41 Ibid., pp. 65–70.
42 Ibid., pp. 58–62.
43 Ibid., p. 273.
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Orkneys being reported in March 1942.44 Labour supply was insufficient because
a combination of harsh climatic conditions, scarce accommodation, isolation from
city life and frequent air raids made the islands an unpopular workplace. Air raids,
in particular, had a significant impact, as many workers left after each raid. Miners
from the Midlands sent to work on the Orkney defences after the outbreak of war
rarely stayed for more than six weeks, despite being paid twice as much as in the
Midlands.45 The fact that workers such as miners, who were familiar with arduous
work types and conditions, shunned the Orkneys despite double pay, emphasises
the islands’ unpopularity. The general manpower shortage, brought about by
call-ups that constrained the British war economy from summer 1941 onwards,
exacerbated the situation in the Orkneys.46 Balfour Beatty’s civilian workforce
had been severely depleted by 1941 ‘by conscription and harsh conditions on the
island’. Civilian labour was increasingly withdrawn from the barriers and deployed
on other military projects, such as defence works in the south of England in
1941 and the construction of Mulberry harbours in 1943.47Mulberry harbours
were artificial ports built in Britain to supply Allied troops during the Normandy
campaign and two of them were deployed on the French coast in the immediate
aftermath of the Allied landings.48 Demand for civilian workers and engineers on
critical military projects throughout Britain, such as the Churchill barriers, by far
outstripped supply.
The government responded with compulsory employment, increasing
monetary incentives and tapping alternative labour pools. The Ministry of Labour
introduced the ‘Orkney and Shetlands Labour Agreement’ in 1940 whereby it
recruited workmen and compelled them to stay on the job for at least three
months. National Service Officers were sent on site for enforcement purposes and
high monetary incentives and bonus schemes were introduced to attract workers.
Migrant Irish workers initially made up the majority of the workforce, but their
supply quickly dried up. After anti-British slogans were found in their huts,
additional Irish workers were banned from entering the islands.49 The Admiralty
argued that Irish or Northern Irish labour ‘might carry information regarding
the disposition of the Fleet’ and defended the ban against severe criticisms from
the Ministry of Labour.50 Other foreign workers were used instead, but these
substitutes were insufficient. In 1942, for example, 120 Norwegians worked on
the underground fuel facility at Lyness, but this facility still lacked 340 workers,
mostly tunnel miner labourers.51
44 TNA, ADM 1/12054, Fettard, Cabinet Section, 5 Mar. 1942.
45 Roskill, War at Sea, vol. i, p. 79.
46 Margaret Gowing, ‘Organisation of Manpower in Britain during the Second World War’,
Journal of Contemporary History, 7, 1–2 (1972), p. 153.
47 MacDonald, Churchill’s Prisoners, pp. 33–7.
48 Dear and Foot (eds), Oxford Companion, pp. 596–7.
49 Hewison, This Great Harbour, pp. 273–4, 306.
50 TNA, ADM 1/12054, ‘Visit to Orkneys 4–7 Mar. 1942’ by Morgan (Ministry of Labour) and
Nowlan (Admiralty), 10 Mar. 1942, p. 4, point 3.
51 Ibid., p. 3, point 3.
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Admiralty and Ministry of Labour representatives visited the Orkneys in March
1942 to investigate the ‘considerable wastage of labour during the past 8–10
months’. Their visit had two objectives. First, to amend the Orkney Agreement
to ‘retain the largest possible number of men on the contracts’ and to ‘recruit
as early as possible the necessary number of workmen’.52 Second, the visit was
intended to assess the viability of extending the ‘payment by results scheme’. The
representatives found that labour shortages persisted and that whilst the payment
by result scheme was widely used for eighteen different jobs on the island, it
could be extended further.53 Two main factors caused the wastage of labour, the
‘loneliness’ on the islands and the low standard of basic amenities, notably ‘food
and sleeping accommodation’.54 Moreover, the representatives recommended
tightening the Orkneys agreement. Civilians would now work on the islands for a
minimum of six months instead of three;55 transport arrangements and payments
for home leaves would be eased and monetary incentives were introduced for
workers who forewent their entitlement to a one week holiday after three months
of work.56
Labour was extremely scarce in the Orkneys because of excess demand,
accommodation bottlenecks, arduous working conditions and exposure to enemy
air raids. Government officials fought the labour scarcity on two different
fronts. Monetary rewards for foregoing holidays and piece rate schemes were
implemented to raise output; coercion augmented labour supply. Despite these
efforts, voluntary civilian labour remained insufficient. British workers shunned
the islands or were withdrawn for other projects; Irish workers were not desired;
foreign workers were lacking in both numbers and skills. A solution became
apparent – the use of Italian POWs. Their supply was abundant; they could be
forced to work; they were perfectly spatially mobile; and they had no exit option.
IV
The Admiralty employed Italian POWs in the Orkneys from 1942 to 1945. Its
allocations received priority over other departments. POW employment increased
over time both in quantity and in quality. As labour shortages on the islands
rose, POWs were gradually substituted for civilian labour. After the armistice in
September 1943, POWs were increasingly employed on skilled jobs and gained
the trust of civilians. Red Cross reports reveal that the two camps were fully geared
towards heavy manual employment and that the welfare concerns raised by the
52 TNA, ADM 1/12054, ‘Secret memorandum in explanation of the Amendments proposed to
the Above Agreement’, point 2.
53 TNA, ADM 1/12054, ‘Visit to Orkneys’, p. 1, point 1 and enclosure ‘A’.
54 Ibid., p. 4, point iv.
55 TNA, ADM 1/12054, ‘Orkneys and Shetlands agreements 1940 amendments’, 1 Apr. 1942,
p. 2; WO 32/1740, ‘Orkneys and Shetlands agreements 1940’, 27 Jul. 1940, p. 3, paragraph 6.
56 TNA, ADM 1/12054, ‘Orkneys and Shetlands agreements 1940 amendments’, 1 Apr. 1942,
pp. 2–3.
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POWs through strikes were not unfounded as living and working conditions were
initially harsh, but these had improved by 1945.
The construction of the Churchill barriers proceeded in three stages. First,
stones were quarried and concrete blocks casted. Second, the quarried rockfill
was filled into steel net bags, so-called ‘bolsters’, which were transported to the
sounds by lorry or railway, hoisted over the sea and tipped out via cable ways.
Finally, concrete blocks formed the final layer of the barriers once the rockfill
layers were above sea level. POWs were involved in all three production stages
performing heavy manual work for the actual construction process. They built
production facilities such as quarries or block yards, worked in the quarries, mixed
cement, casted concrete blocks, drove and repaired lorries, managed compressors,
acted as signalmen, operated cableways and deposited rocks into the sea.57 The
workforce included both POWs and civilian workers, but over time the civilian
share decreased and POWs were increasingly used for skilled work.
At the time, the barriers were an unprecedented and daring engineering
project and many experts predicted that adverse weather conditions would wash
them away before completion. Over 250,000 stones and 66,000 concrete blocks
were used and the project was extremely costly.58 Total construction costs of the
barriers were estimated at £2.5million. Compared to the accumulated Admiralty
expenditure of £10.5million on plant and machine tools for naval shipbuilding
and marine engineering contracts between 1940 and 1944, the cost of the barriers
represents a sizeable amount.59 The scarcity of highly specialised equipment and
heavy manual labour also posed persistent problems. For instance, one of the
two cableways used to dump the rockfill into the sea was imported from Iraq.
Furthermore, a 15,000 ton accommodation and transportation ship, numerous
lorries, railway wagons, cranes and boats were shipped to the islands. The
Admiralty noted in its final report that the barriers prevented enemy entry into
the bay and that they were a ‘significant engineering feat’, but it considered them
‘an uneconomical scheme of defence’ given the large amount of wartime labour
and shipping required.60
When the government first proposed to transfer Italian POWs to Britain for
employment in June 1941, the Admiralty requested that 2,900 of the first 25,000
Italians be allocated for employment in the Orkneys on the Churchill barriers
to replace Irish civilian labour.61 The request illustrates the Italians’ key role as a
substitute for the Irish and reveals uncertainty about the feasibility of the proposed
employment. The Orkney defences were also prioritised over other POW labour
57 TNA, WO 32/10740, ‘Orkneys. Bonus cigarette issue to POWs’.
58 Chapel Preservation Committee, Orkney’s Italian Chapel (Kirkwall, The Orcadian, 1992),
p. 3.
59 Michael M. Postan, British War Production, History of the Second World War, Volume 2 (rev. edn,
London, HMSO, 1975), p. 204, table 27.
60 Hewison, This Great Harbour, pp. 311–12.
61 TNA, CAB 66/16, 120 (41), ‘Proposal to bring 25,000 Italian POWs to this Country –Report
by the Lord President of the Council’, 4 Jun. 1941.
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 Burray:  
Camp 34 
Lamb Holm:  
Camp 60 
Total strength 
Camp capacity  400 460 860 
Actual strength 576 594 1,170 
Excess strength 44.0 % 29.1 % 36.5 % 
Housed in 
barracks 
400 500 900 
Housed in tents 174 93 267 
Medical officers 1 1 2 
Chaplains 1 0 1 
NCOs and privates 574 593 1,167 
In hospital  7 8 15 
Figure 1. Orkney POW camp strengths, 30 August 1942.*
*ACICR, Camps 34 and 60, 30 Aug. 1942.
projects. The War Office gave up six hundred POW workers in June 1942, at the
Admiralty’s request, ‘for urgent work in the Orkneys’.62
The first batch of Italian POWs for employment in the Orkneys reached
Britain at the end of 1941. Six hundred out of seven thousand recently arrived
Italian POWs were designated to ‘a special Admiralty job in the Orkneys’.63
They were collected from Edinburgh Waverley railway station in January 1942
and distributed to two camps, Burray (Camp 34) and Lamb Holm (Camp 60).
An ICRC report confirms that six hundred additional POWs arrived in July as
the War Office’s concession had suggested, so by 30 August 1942, 1,170 POWs
were housed in the Orkneys (see Figure 1).64 Still, accommodation bottlenecks
constrained the maximum desired POW labour strength. Of the 1,200 Italians
who had previously arrived, 255 were sent back to the mainland in September
1942 ‘owing to the lack of sufficient permanent accommodation’; they were
employed in agriculture in England and Wales leaving 945 POWs in the islands
for employment.65 In 1943, at its peak, 1,200 Italians and 520 British workers
were employed on the barriers, compared to ‘normal times’ where the Italians
numbered around 920 and the British about 350.66 Therefore, only a third of the
workforce was civilian while the majority consisted of POWs. Most POWs left in
September 1944 when the barriers had been completed. They were transferred
to Skipton, Yorkshire, for agricultural employment prior to repatriation to Italy.67
62 TNA, WO 165/59, Summary of Actions Taken, no. 9, July 1942, point 7c.
63 TNA, LAB 8/126, General Gebb to Barnes, 29 Oct. 1942, ‘Italian POWs’, point 3.
64 Archives du Comité International de la Croix Rouge, Geneva [hereafter ACICR], C SC,
Service des camps, Grande-Bretagne, RT, camp de prisonniers de guerre 34, 30 Aug. 1942, file
B.de P/JPS/MBG [hereafter camp 34, 30 Aug. 1942], p. 1.
65 TNA, WO 165/59, Summary no. 10, August 1942, point 11c.
66 TNA, ADM 116/5790, ‘An Account of the Closing of the Eastern Entrances’, point 22.
67 TNA, ADM 116/5790, ‘An Account of the Closing of the Eastern Entrances’, point 44.
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A small POW ‘rear party’ remained behind to clear up the sites and a few artisan
POWs stayed until 1945 to complete the conversion of a Nissen hut into an Italian
chapel. All POWs had left the islands by 15 December 1945.68 The chapel still
exists today and attracts 90,000 visitors per year as a major Scottish tourist site.69
Most POW workers were unskilled and only a minority was technically
skilled.70 According to the August 1942 ICRC report, 54 per cent of Lamb
Holm’s POWs were illiterate.71 Assuming skilled labour is mostly literate this
implies a high proportion of unskilled workers. The contractors attempted to
attain ‘additional POWs with tradesmen’s skill’ in March 1942, but it is unlikely
that the second batch of Italians arriving in July 1942 was more skilled because
the high proportion of illiterate POWs was observed in August after the second
batch had arrived.72 The officer ratio in both camps was extremely low. Only
two medical officers and one lieutenant chaplain were among the inmates, the
remainder being non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and privates, yielding an
officer ratio of 0.26 per cent.73 This undercuts the average of 0.42 per cent
in Britain and is substantially lower than the average Italian POW officer ratio
within the British Commonwealth of 6.25 per cent.74 High POW labour demand
explains the extraordinarily low officer ratio. As officers could only volunteer and
could not be forced to work, a lower officer ratio would maximise the POW
labour force. POWs seem to have been screened twice for employment in the
Orkneys to ensure a suitable workforce. At the point of origin, mostly privates
were chosen to be shipped to the Orkneys. Upon arrival, sick and physically unfit
POWs considered to be unsuitable for the kinds of heavy manual work involved
were removed from the islands.
The prisoners complained about employment conditions shortly after their
arrival in March 1942, arguing that their work was directly linked to the war
effort and hence illegal under the Geneva Convention. Their protest and ensuing
refusal to work were unsuccessful as the British authorities claimed that they were
not building military barriers but civilian causeways. However, three more strikes
followed. A second strike in July against the ‘insufficiency of the [camp] canteen’
was punished by a seven-day water and bread diet.75 The six hundred newcomers
who had arrived in the same month and whom the British camp commander
considered more hostile than the incumbent POWs probably triggered this strike,
68 TNA, WO 165/59, Summary no. 54, November 1945, point 31.
69 The Scotsman, 5 Jul. 2008.
70 MacDonald, Churchill’s Prisoners, pp. 38–40.
71 ACICR, C SC, Service des camps, Grande-Bretagne, RT, camp de prisonniers de guerre 60,
30 Aug. 1942, file B.de P/JPS/MBG [hereafter camp 60, 30 Aug. 1942], p. 5.
72 TNA, ADM 1/12054, Visit to Orkneys, 10 Mar. 1942, p. 2.
73 Chaplains and medical officers count as officers, yielding an officer ratio of 3/1,170 (0.256%).
ACICR, camp 34, 24 Aug. 1942 and camp 60, 30 Aug. 1942.
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given the unexpectedly harsh living conditions and the monotonous diet that
prisoners frequently criticised.76 Lamb Holm camp stopped working again from
5 to 12 August 1942.77 A fourth strike followed in September at one camp and
lasted for almost one month.78 In addition, three attacks on guards and several
cases of ‘insubordination’ and ‘disobedience’ on Lamb Holm during 1942 were
met with disciplinary punishment. The ICRC considered general discipline ‘not
too bad’, but recommended the ‘removal of certain indisciplinary elements’.79
The incidents were always caused by the same eight ‘rebels’ in Lamb Holm while
prisoners in Burray were less hostile.80 MacDonald mentions a one-day ‘rebellion’
of one hut, but he neither specifies which hut nor when it occurred. In this
‘rebellion’, the prisoners refused to work because they were fed up with the ‘biting
wind and rain’ and the arduous work. They resumed work the following day given
weather improvements and persistent overnight searches by British guards.81 It
is unclear form MacDonald’s account whether the four strikes discussed above
include this rebellion. The ‘one camp’ to which both MacDonald and the ICRC
referred but did not identify, must be Lamb Holm which the ICRC described as
more hostile. The prisoners thus protested with strikes against the alleged illegal
nature of work and raised welfare concerns, particularly about the harsh work
conditions that had alienated civilians already.
POWs worked under the same conditions as civilian workers.82 They always
worked together with civilian workers, mainly complementing Balfour Beatty
staff as unskilled workers performing heavy manual work and completed a variety
of different tasks related to dumping the bolsters and concrete blocks in the sea.
The initial language barrier was apparently no significant impediment to the
performance of these unskilled tasks.83 POWs from Lamb Holm were shipped
daily to St Mary’s, near Holm on the Orkney mainland, to make concrete
blocks, attend on cableway dumping, unload barges of cages and cement and
perform camp maintenance work. POWs and civilian workers depended on
each other during the production process. British civilians for instance operated
the excavators in the quarries producing the rockfill which POWs dumped in
the sea. The cableway and the blockyard at St Mary’s were solely manned by
British civilians. POW work also relied on good weather conditions. The Lamb
Holm squads needed boats to reach their workplace at St Mary’s, so bad weather
disrupted production. POWs sometimes had to return to Lamb Holm early
because of gale warnings or could not work at all if boat passages were impossible.
76 Ibid.
77 TNA, WO 32/10740, Johnson-Burt (Civil-Engineer in-Chief ’s Department, Admiralty) to
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POWs at Lamb Holm operated two cableways, did plumbing, unloaded sand, coal,
bolster cages and cement, constructed a blockyard, painted buildings and mixed
concrete.84 While the POW employment conditions were set by the rules of the
Geneva Convention, the incentive schemes put in place at Scapa Flow were highly
unusual. The Geneva Convention prescribed a maximum weekly work period of
forty-eight hours (eight hours per day six days a week). The prisoners were paid
3
4
d. for unskilled and 11
2
d. for skilled work per hour, but only a fraction of their
credits could be converted into token money redeemable for goods in the camp
canteen. Over time they were allowed to remit parts of their credits home and the
maximum daily amount that they could spend in the canteen was increased.
The government devoted extraordinary attention to the prisoners’ produc-
tivity. The War Office contemplated a bonus scheme in spring 1942 to increase
prisoner productivity in view of ‘the extreme importance attached by the Admi-
ralty to the furtherance of this project’.85 The Admiralty estimated that on average
both camps deposited 2,200 bolsters into the sea per week. Bonus cigarettes
would be issued if weekly output exceeded this average.86 However, the scheme
was dropped because efficient management techniques were already in place and
because external factors independent of POW output, such as weather problems
and low civilian labour productivity, would have reduced POW bonuses.87
By 1943, the camp commanders’ personal management style and reward
systems yielded good results in increasing POW compliance and productivity. The
Admiralty noted in January 1943 that ‘there certainly has been an improvement
since the strike in the men’s attitude’. The two camp Commandants had used their
personality ‘to the maximum effect’ and issued cigarette rewards for workdays
exceeding eight hours.88 A reward system compensating for long working hours
therefore appeased the prisoners’ work resentments. After the hard winter of
1942–3, ‘task work’ was introduced which reduced the POW work burden.
A POW gang was relieved for the day and civilians took over after the fulfilment
of daily quotas or ‘tasks’. Captivity conditions were eased following the Italian
armistice in September 1943. They were now paid in cash, allowed to purchase a
radio and to own bicycles.89 They could leave the camps and ‘mix freely with the
local people’ and also performed farm work.90
In addition to the incentive schemes, prisoner productivity and efficiency
increased over time through training and diversification of use. The prisoners were
84 TNA, WO 32/10740, Johnston-Burt (Civil-Engineer-in Chief ’s Department, Admiralty) to
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trained and used as skilled or semi-skilled labour; for instance they manned water
pumps at Echnaloch providing water for the entire Warebanks operations. POW
labour transfers from unskilled to skilled tasks stemmed mostly from the with-
drawal of civilian labour through conscription and alternative defence projects. In
July 1943, another blockyard to cast concrete blocks was opened at Tankerness.
As its civilian quarry workers were transferred to the south of England to
complete the Mulberry harbours, they were replaced by POWs. The first barrier
had been completed by August 1943, releasing further POW labour to replace
civilian labour on tasks like blockcasting.91 POW employment on more sensitive
and skilled jobs only increased significantly after the armistice in September 1943.
About a dozen POWs were employed in the Balfour Beatty machine workshop,
such as a former Ferrari engineer, who repaired and tuned engines on pumps and
concrete mixers. Cases of fraternisation, although officially forbidden, occurred
frequently. Balfour Beatty workers traded food for handicraft items or bought the
prisoners snacks for illegal cash; a lorry driver took a POW to Kirkwall so that he
could sell handmade artefacts and make purchases in town.92 The government’s
and camp commanders’ successful efforts to increase POW productivity and the
gradual training and substitution of prisoners for civilian labour – the latter par-
ticularly intensifying post-armistice – demonstrate the extraordinary dependence
upon the prisoners for the timely construction of the barriers.
In May 1944, the British government introduced the ‘co-operator’ status
amongst Italian POWs and encouraged the prisoners to become ‘co-operators’
rather than remaining ‘non-co-operators’. ‘Co-operators’ would receive more
privileges such as cash payments and more freedom of movement in return
for more extensive usage of their labour.93 There is no explicit proof that the
prisoners in the Orkneys accepted the co-operator proposal in May 1944, but
some evidence suggests it. Remittances to Italy mentioned by MacDonald and
advantages in pay and mobility cited by the ICRC in 1945 were only available
to co-operators.94 The barriers were almost complete prior to the proposal and
most prisoners left four months later, so the effect of these incentives on the
barriers’ completion must have been rather small. It could be argued that the
longer the prisoners remained on the islands displaying cooperative behaviour,
the more they would be integrated into skilled labour processes. However,
extensive integration only occurred post-armistice. The Commandants’ efforts
had improved the prisoners’ attitude by January 1943, but it remains unclear to
what extent and how cooperative prisoners were in general. One ex-POW stated
in 1994 that he and his fellow inmates had initially been reluctant to work on a
military project.95 There had been four POW strikes in 1942, newcomer POWs
91 MacDonald, Churchill’s Prisoners, pp. 13, 33, 37.
92 Ibid., pp.18, 37–8, 42.
93 Sponza, ‘Italian Prisoners in Britain’, pp. 210–11.
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remained hostile towards their captors and resented the harsh conditions and the
nature of the project, so full POW cooperation was unlikely. MacDonald asserts
that the prisoners were ‘generally speaking quite cooperative’ after the removal of
the two camp leaders in March 1942 and that they welcomed the armistice.96
However, he may have presented POW-captor relations as excessively idyllic.
First, the ICRC delegates and camp commanders still mentioned uncooperative
POWs in August 1942, five months after the camp leaders’ removal. Second,
MacDonald only mentions two ‘rebellions’, including the March 1942 strike,
while at least four proper strikes occurred according to ICRC and government
documents. Admittedly the improvement in attitude by January 1943 and the
absence of strikes after 1942 imply that co-operation increased, but only to a
limited extent. The POWs were only allowed on sensitive jobs post-armistice and
their welcome of the armistice was probably motivated by repatriation prospects
rather than their willingness to help Britain’s war effort. Several studies on
German and Italian POWs in Britain show that their morale largely depended
on repatriation prospects, as ‘going home’ was their top priority and political
considerations mostly came second.97 MacDonald’s account thus downplays the
prisoners’ tendency to strike and exaggerates their cooperation with the captor.
ICRC delegates visited both camps on 30 August 1942, providing an insight
into camp conditions. The delegates were satisfied in general but acknowledged
the disadvantageous location and climate compared to other POW camps. The
prisoners complained about long working hours, but the ICRC found them
permissible since ten-hour days during summer were compensated for by six-hour
days in the winter. The length of the working day depended on the availability
of daylight.98 However, the government’s frequent emphasis on making full use
of the long daylight in the summer months reveals its intentions to maximise
prisoner productivity.99 The prisoners also criticised overpopulation, monotonous
food and a lack of soap and drinking water.100 A new fresh water reservoir pump
was being installed because gales had repeatedly destroyed the previous ones. The
delegates noted that fifty POWs suffered from dysentery upon arrival ‘from their
stay in the Orient’. Together with those POWs ‘who did not possess a sufficiently
robust physical constitution’, they were relieved from work and moved from the
Orkneys to other camps.101 The report exposes accommodation and medical
problems on the islands. Both camps were overcrowded as Figure 1 illustrates;
actual camp strength exceeded capacity by thirty-six per cent. As a result, 267
POWs unable to be housed in barracks lived in tents. The camp commander
assured the Red Cross delegates that tents ‘would not be used anymore from the
96 MacDonald, Churchill’s Prisoners, pp. 9, 35.
97 Moore and Fedorowich, The British Empire, p. 6; Sponza, ‘Italian POWs in Britain’, pp. 213–15.
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end of September’ for Burray.102 While this comment implies that these POWs
would be housed in proper barracks with the advent of colder weather, the above
evidence suggests that those POWs housed in tents actually left the islands in
September because no permanent accommodation was available for them.
The prisoners’ medical conditions mirrored the harsh climate. Both camps only
had provisional infirmaries without electrical lighting, so seriously ill patients were
transferred to the Kirkwall military hospital. On the day of the ICRC visit fifteen
POWs, or 1.3 per cent of the POW population, were kept in the Kirkwall military
hospital. Most patients suffered from symptoms caused by arduous work and cold
weather. Burray reported cases of Otitis media, common colds and rheumatism
and Lamb Holm had five cases of bronchitis.103 The fact that a ‘robust physical
constitution’ was a prerequisite for selection for the Orkneys and the frequency
of rheumatisms confirms the consequences of the arduous manual work that the
prisoners performed. Fatality rates, however, were relatively low. The Admiralty
noted that over the entire construction and clearing up period of the barriers,
there were ‘only ten fatal accidents’ among civilian and POW workers, seven of
which were due to drowning.104 Of these ten fatalities, eight were civilians and
two were Italian POWs.105
However, by November 1945 considerable improvements in living and
working conditions were revealed in an ICRC report on Burray. Camp facilities
had been upgraded through the provision of more barracks, electricity and
heating. The prisoners could move freely within five miles of the camp and make
purchases in shops. The ICRC judged camp morale as ‘excellent’, due to the
POWs elevated mood in awaiting repatriation. Lamb Holm had been closed, so
overall POW strength had fallen to 420, less than half of the number present in
1942.106 Although the lower camp strength indicates a lower labour demand for
POWs after the barriers’ completion, they were still being employed, mainly on
road construction, building works or repairing fences.107
V
The POWs went on multiple strikes in 1942 not only to express their
dissatisfaction with the harsh living and employment conditions but, more
importantly, to protest against the illegality of work under the Geneva
Convention. While government authorities and the ICRC considered these latter
protests not to be justified, the following discussion reveals that the prisoners’
appraisal was correct and that the authorities rebranded the project as civilian to
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disguise its military nature and continue employment. In March 1942, the Italian
POWs in the Orkneys ‘had ceased work on the grounds that it was of a character
forbidden under article 31 of the 1929 Geneva Convention’.108 According to
article 31, ‘work done by prisoners of war shall have no direct connection with
the operations of the war’. In case of violation, POWs had the right under article
42 to complain through their ‘Protecting Power’, a neutral country representing
their interests.109 The POWs did so, since they assumed that they were working
on military defences against Germany. The two POW camp leaders wrote a letter
to the camp commander claiming that they were compelled to carry out ‘works
of a warlike nature’ contrary to article 31. Also, their maintenance directly in
the vicinity of a British naval base put them in a dangerous position and violated
article 32 prohibiting ‘unhealthy or dangerous work’. They requested transfers to
a different camp where the Convention was respected. If transfer arrangements
did not commence within a week, the Italian POWs insisted that they would
cease to work.110 Eventually, both camps stopped working on 9 March 1942.111
Following the strike, an officer of the POW Directorate and a representative of
the Protecting Power visited the Orkneys to investigate the claim. Switzerland
was Italy’s Protecting Power at the time. The ICRC, although also based in
Switzerland, possessed a different role, inspecting POW camps as an independent
intermediary as mentioned above. British authorities found it ‘satisfactory to note’
that the Protecting Power representative had agreed that the Geneva Convention
had not been breached.112 ICRC delegates confirmed in August 1942 that article
31 was ‘respected’ and that article 32 had not been breached as ‘the work is neither
unhealthy nor dangerous’.113 MacDonald claims that Major Buckland, the new
second British camp commander, persuaded the POWs to end the strike.114 Prior
to spring 1942, there was only one commander for both camps, but subsequently
camp commands were split and Buckland had been appointed for Lamb Holm
camp. Buckland spoke Italian fluently and conversed with the prisoners every day
after roll-call, immediately gaining the prisoners’ trust. The POWs were assured in
a meeting with him and the Kirkwall Provost that no danger would arise from the
naval base and that they would work on a civilian causeway benefiting the local
people.115 Henceforth, the barriers in official documents were always referred to
as ‘causeways’ to avoid charges of illegality.116 The prisoners accepted and endured
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a two-week punishment diet as a disciplinary action for having refused work while
the Protecting Power’s investigation was ongoing.117 The two camp leaders and
‘one or two’ others considered responsible for the mutiny were removed from
the Orkneys and work was resumed.118 While MacDonald portrayed Buckland’s
dealings with the prisoners as friendly, Buckland’s actions described above convey
determination to continue the labour project. He manipulated the prisoners,
downplayed the military nature of work, rebranded the barriers as ‘causeways’,
removed non-compliant POWs, immediately resumed employment and sustained
work morale in 1943 using cigarette issues as rewards for long workdays.
Although Italian POWs in Britain frequently refused to work, the Orkney
strike received extraordinary attention from the government. It distinguished
between individual incidents such as fraternisation, assault or theft and collective
incidents (mainly work refusals). Based on government reports, Sponza found
sixty-seven Italian POW camps had at least one collective incident of work refusal
between January 1943 and June 1944, mostly down to alleged violations of the
Convention or bad working conditions.119 The Orkney strike stands out for
Sponza as one of the three most important cases. The other two, protests against
British press statements about Italian POWs and against employment in lead mines
in Cumberland, also occurred in 1942. These other protests lasted several weeks
and ended Italian POW employment in mining.120 Following these strike waves,
the War Office was careful to avoid work refusals on legal grounds to prevent
a loss in production. In 1943 it issued a recommendation to avoid ‘employing
POWs borderline cases’. Proposals to employ Italian POWs on road construction
near artillery ranges were rejected in case the prisoners ceased work because
they considered this an infringement of article 31.121 Economic and military
considerations therefore brought the Orkney strike to the government’s attention.
Government sources also emphasised the Orkney incident. Monthly War
Office reports listed the Orkney strike separately, which was highly unusual.
Sir Harold Satow, director of the POW Department at various times between
1940 and 1944, also mentioned it in a publication concerning the department’s
history.122 Most importantly, however, the upsurge in government activity
following the strike mirrors the importance of the Churchill barrier project.
Government investigations, the despatch of an additional Italian-speaking British
major, the removal of rebellious POWs and the rebranding of the project
as civilian, all demonstrate how highly the government valued the project’s
continuation. The Admiralty admitted in March 1942 that the POWs were
117 MacDonald, Churchill’s Prisoners, pp. 8–9.
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necessary to pursue this defence project: ‘If the POWs are withdrawn, the work
cannot proceed unless it is manned with British labour.’123 The threat of losing
them posed a serious problem, because obtaining British labour at a time of severe
manpower shortages and other pressing military projects was almost impossible;
arduous working conditions in the Orkneys deterred civilians and Irishmen were
banned. There was no viable alternative to employing the POWs, so significant
efforts to declare their work legal and to allow it to continue are hardly surprising.
Several sources demonstrate that contemporaries were aware of the military
nature of project. Sir Austin Hudson, Civil Lord of Admiralty, emphasised the
barriers’ military motive in 1940: ‘This [permanent blocking of the eastern
entrances] is all the more necessary in view of possible M.T.B. [Motor Torpedo
Boat] attack and will have to be carried up to high water level.’124 MacDonald
confirms that the prisoners rightly complained about the illegality of work:
The POWs were of course quite correct in their original appraisal of the
situation at Scapa Flow. The prime purpose of their project was to deny
enemy submarines access to the Flow, which was a tremendously busy naval
base throughout the wartime period. There, the Home Fleet was strategically
placed. Convoys came and went. ‘Lame Ducks’ limped in from every action at
Norway, and casualties of the North Atlantic weather were escorted in.125
Sponza concurs that ‘it was arguably a military project’, as the causeways were
constructed ‘to prevent the repetition of a German U-Boat penetrating the
defences of Scapa Flow and inflicting serious damage to the fleet harboured
there’.126 Hewison also concludes that the barriers had a military purpose
defending the eastern entrances of the Flow ‘against seaborne attack either on
the surface or under it’.127 Hewison mentions the claim that the prisoners
complained about the illegality of employment and that the barriers were renamed
to causeways. However, he continues: ‘Whether this is true or not, it appears
that latterly the Italians were not employed on the actual Barrier-building’.128
This claim can now be rejected, as it is clear from the above evidence that
POWs were actively involved in the construction of the barriers and contributed
much more to its construction than civilian labour. It remains unclear why
Hewison makes this incorrect claim but his preceding comment indicates that he
wanted to distance himself from the illegality debate. More recent accounts also
illustrate the belief in the military objective. Ex-POWs returning to the Italian
Chapel in 1992 and 2008 mentioned the barriers’ objective to protect Scapa from
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U-Boats.129 Similarly, a booklet published by the Orcadian on the Italian Chapel
1992 notes that the Italians were ‘sent to Orkney to work on the Churchill
barriers, a massive series of concrete causeways which seal the eastern approaches
to Scapa Flow’.130 While these accounts are aware of the nature of the work,
like MacDonald they rarely mention the harsh living and employment conditions
to which the prisoners were exposed. Conversely, this article has illustrated that
harsh conditions triggered multiple strikes. The ICRC considered the conditions
satisfactory and they improved considerably over time, but hard manual labour
on an isolated island must have been harder to endure than, for example, rural
employment in England.
While contemporary sources, including those generated by the Admiralty,
do agree on the military nature of the project, the ICRC left a more open
interpretation. The August 1942 ICRC report, which found the POW work
permissible under the Convention, considered the work as:
the construction of a breakwater which will connect three neighbouring
islands, as well as the construction of a causeway along this route. Some
prisoners work in a quarry from which the building materials are extracted.
The beginning of these works may have been decided long before the war.131
The ICRC delegates acknowledged POW employment in quarries but most
importantly they referred to the works not as barriers but as a ‘breakwater’
with a ‘causeway’ on top. Their description implies that they had accepted the
British rebranding from ‘barriers’ to ‘causeways’. However, their speculation that
the project had been approved before the war is unfounded. While it had been
planned sinceWorldWar One to permanently close off the eastern entrances using
blockships, orders to erect barriers using rockfill and concrete blocks had not been
given until after hostilities had commenced.132 As mentioned above, Churchill
approved the project in March 1940. Evidence from Admiralty files shows that the
decision for permanent blocking was made between February and March 1940: In
February, Scapa Flow’s Director of Local Defences, R. M. Servaes, had signalled
strong support for the Admiralty’s suggestion of ‘specially designed permanent
obstructions’ at the eastern entrances.133 Yet, his previous correspondence had
never mentioned permanent blocking. In addition to this, the idea of permanent
blocking was only to appear in weekly defence reports from March 1940.134 Later
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reports describe preliminary work and construction was expected to commence in
April 1940.135 Therefore, the plan to permanently block off Scapa Flow’s eastern
entrances was only drawn up and implemented after the war had started. The
construction clearly had a military and not a civilian objective. In light of this
evidence, the reasoning of the ICRC that the barrier’s use and intention was
civilian, while this clearly was not the case, has to be examined more closely.
In August 1942, the ICRC reported that POW employment at Scapa Flow
was legal and that general camp conditions were satisfactory. However, ICRC
correspondence with the Foreign Office four months later was more critical. The
ICRC condemned conditions at Lamb Holm in a covering letter accompanying
the submission of all recent camp reports from Britain to the Foreign Office:
Nevertheless, let me allow us to draw your attention to the requests made
by the POWs from camp 60 and also to the observations made by our
delegates, observations that mostly refer to the overcrowding of the camp, the
insufficiency of the infirmary and the material and the duration and nature of
the work. We thank you in advance for the attention that you will devote to
the aforementioned points.136
The legality of work was mentioned indirectly but no urgent action was
recommended. However, this letter explicitly singles out the Orkney camp
from all recent reports undertaken in Britain and indirectly criticises camp and
employment conditions in the Orkneys. The prisoners’ complaints from the
August report are mentioned and raised more directly. As the ICRC, in general,
employed very cautious language in its communications, indirect criticisms can be
interpreted as actually far more serious than the reports indicate on the surface.137
Thus, the ICRC’s approval was not as straightforward as portrayed in its official
reports.
Sponza puts forward a reason for the ICRC’s diverging accounts: Switzerland
had replaced Brazil as a Protecting Power for Italy in early 1942.138 The change
had occurred only a few weeks before the complaint at Scapa Flow. Sponza claims
that the Swiss would rather approve doubtful cases of POW employment than the
Brazilians because Switzerland was generally ‘regarded more understanding of the
British position, whenever actual or potential diplomatic disputes arose’.139 This
might have helped the British in declaring POW employment at Scapa Flow
January to March 1940. The preparatory work for the permanent blocking is first mentioned in the
thirteenth weekly defence report at the end of March. TNA, ADM 116/4111, 13th Scapa Flow
defence report, 28 Mar. 1940, point 4.
135 TNA, ADM 116/4111, 14th defence report, 4 Apr. 1940, point 4.
136 TNA, FO 916/308, ICRC to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 2 Dec. 1942,
author’s own translation from French.
137 Sponza, ‘Italian POWs in Britain’, p. 209.
138 Sponza, Divided Loyalties, p. 189.
139 Ibid., p. 218, n. 20.
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legal and continuing to make full use of it. In other words, the Protecting Power
change shifted the bargaining power regarding the legality of POW employment
in Britain’s favour. Once the Swiss had approved, it seemed more difficult for
the ICRC to disagree and criticise conditions. This may explain the ICRC’s
statement about the civilian purpose of the barriers. Thus, the legal approval of
‘causeways’ at Scapa Flow may have contributed to the completion of defences
against German U-Boats. These circumstances might have directly aided Britain’s
war effort. While the POW workforce in the Orkneys was relatively small
compared to the peak of Italian POW employment in Britain, the prisoners’
work still prevented enemy entry into a harbour central to the British naval war
strategy.
The War Office justified the legality of employment at the time, using an
argument very similar to that of the ICRC, namely that the barriers were intended
for civilian use. Although the Admiralty had mentioned the prisoners’ potential
employment on ‘barriers’ in 1941, the War Office referred to them in 1942 as
‘causeways between the islands’ and argued that ‘the propriety of this employment
had been carefully considered long before the prisoners were put to it’.140 Civilians
were indeed employed on the barriers before the prisoners arrived, but this
argument does not mitigate the violation of the Convention. The POWs were
not employed on the construction of causeways, but on a military defence project.
The ‘propriety of this employment’, referring to the legality of employment,
appeared to only have been of concern after the intervention of the Protecting
Power in 1942, so it was actually not considered prior to it. In the official history
of the POW department, Sir Harold Satow, who served as its director several times
during wartime, has argued the POW employment was legally permissible, and
has suggested that both complaints lodged by the POWs were unfounded:
Italian POW labour on a causeway across a channel forming one of the
entrances to a harbour in the north of Scotland was considered to be justifiable,
although the prisoners themselves thought not and for a time refused to work.
Our reasons for considering the work permissible were that the Italian camp
was two miles from a military objective and much further from the harbour and
that the causeway would be primarily for civilian use and convenience and only
secondarily for military traffic. After intervention by the Swiss representatives
the Italians resumed work.141
Satow did not consider that the camps’ situation, two miles from a potential target
for air raids, bombings and submarine attacks was problematic. However, bombing
by air was extremely inaccurate during the Second World War. For instance, only
140 TNA, WO 165/59, Monthly Directorate letter No.5, April 1942, point 10d.
141 Satow and Sée, The Work of the Prisoner of War Department, p. 35.
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twenty per cent of US precision bombs on Germany reached their target area.142
Luftwaffe bombs might have been similarly inaccurate and missed their targets by
more than two miles and hit the Italian POW camps by mistake. This concern
was not unfounded. The Luftwaffe operated almost daily reconnaissance flights to
Scapa Flow in 1940 as it was a popular military target. Sixteen German air raids
and attempted bombings took place, during which at least one bomb went astray.
The threat of bombing was realistic and evidence demonstrated that bombs could
miss their targets.143 The prospect of enemy bombing near POW camps violated
article 32 of the Geneva Convention, the very article that the ICRC had found
to be respected in August 1942. By the time the Italian POWs had arrived in
1942, German bombing had ceased, but it was still a potential risk as Scotland
was within reach of the German air base at Trondheim, a base from which
attacks occurred on Allied convoys until 1943.144 Satow in his statement mentions
‘military traffic’ but claims that it would be secondary to civilian use. However,
the above discussion has shown that the barriers were not planned as causeways
for military or civilian traffic but as naval defences. Also, two of the four islands to
be joined by the ‘causeways’ were uninhabited when construction commenced.145
This fact renders the argument that the barriers would allow traffic and aid civilian
use obsolete because it reveals that the barriers would not significantly ease civilian
(or even military) traffic between the islands, which were mostly uninhabited.
Satow’s justifications for the legality of employment thus do not hold. It appears
that the British government had convinced the Protecting Power and the Red
Cross of the civilian nature and the legality of POW employment, even though
in reality this was not the case.
Against this it could be argued that the violations at Scapa Flow were not severe
in relative terms. Germany’s breaches of the Convention concerning British POW
employment were more frequent and severe than Britain’s contraventions. British
POWs often worked hours that were too long and under bad conditions, they
were exposed to RAF bombings in Germany and coerced to unload bombs in
North Africa. British POWs in Italian hands were treated better and experienced
fewer violations.146 Nevertheless, the timing and nature of the Orkney incident
still mattered. First, the POWs protested when the German U-Boat threat was
still imminent and Scapa Flow’s defences were not yet secured, so their protests
threatened to delay the completion of defences vital for national security. Second,
the shackling crisis escalated because of similar breaches of the Convention.
Also, the Orkney strikes occurred six months before the Pasteur incident, which
marked the turning point in British–German relations from a ‘gentleman’s war’
142 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War), (Washington
DC, Government Publishing Office, 1945), p. 5.
143 Hewison, This Great Harbour, p. 284; Hewison, Scapa Flow in War and Peace, p. 70.
144 Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries (London, MacDonald, 1967), p. 260.
145 TNA, ADM 116/5790, ‘an account of the closing of the Eastern Entrances’, point 9.
146 Satow and Sée, The Work of the Prisoner of War Department, pp. 36–7.
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to a total war. A thorough public examination of the Orkney incident at a time
when Germany was highly sensitive towards violations would not have been
in Britain’s interest. Third, Satow highlighted the Orkney incident as one of
six examples of numerous ‘doubtful cases’. One of these, POW employment
to build aerodromes, was not found permissible.147 Disputes concerning POW
employment were common and taken seriously. Seen in their immediate historical
context, the incidents at Scapa Flow were highly significant.
VI
Scapa Flow was a crucial military hub for the British Home Fleet during the
Second World War, providing a training ground for invasion techniques and a key
turnstile for the Admiralty to support convoys and hunt German battleships. In
light of its strategic importance, it was therefore essential to improve its defences.
Despite government efforts to increase labour supply by reward schemes and
coercion, labour for the construction of the barriers was persistently lacking.
POW employment alleviated manpower shortages and enabled the release of
civilian labour to other military projects such as the Mulberry harbours, which
supported the D-Day operations. Italian POWs accounted for two thirds of the
workforce building the Churchill barriers by 1943 and were the chief contributors
to their construction. Without them, the completion of the barriers would have
taken much longer. The prisoners’ employment secured the barrier’s completion
and relieved labour bottlenecks for other projects critical to the war effort.
The government considered the Orkney project to be of utmost importance
in its military strategy. It was keen to retain the POW labour force and
extend its size and use. POWs were withdrawn from other departments and
shipped to the Orkneys in 1942. However, accommodation bottlenecks ultimately
constrained additional POW labour transfers. Schemes were considered to
increase productivity and skilled POW labour was sought after. POW protests
in the Orkneys in spring 1942 were met by a change in command structure,
reclassification of the project as civilian and the withdrawal of non-compliant
POWs. During the same year, the prisoners voiced their dissatisfaction concerning
the heavy manual work and long working hours through several strikes. Both
contemporary observers and the secondary literature have understated the arduous
nature of work and the prisoners’ tendency to strike. POW output in terms of
bolster and block deposits was given utmost attention, but the introduction of
payment by result schemes to increase POW output was scrapped because the
Commandants’ existing management methods were considered sufficient. POWs
assumed more skilled jobs over time as civilian labour was withdrawn, so the
dependence on POW labour rose steadily towards the barriers’ completion in
1944.
147 Ibid., p. 35.
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The prisoners also protested against the illegality of their employment in
accordance with the Geneva Convention in March 1942, but the government,
Protecting Power and ICRC deemed the work legal. Some observers considered
the project to be civilian or denied the prisoners’ involvement in the actual
construction process, but this article has demonstrated that the evidence does
not bear out either of these assumptions. In contrast to War Office and ICRC
reports, it is also now clear that POW employment in the Orkneys did breach the
Convention. POW workers constructed military harbour defences against enemy
ships and submarines. Italian POWs directly aided the British war effort in this
case.
This study also supports the argument that retaliation was more important
than adherence to the Geneva Convention. Labour demand for a vital military
project made Britain breach the Convention: Britain risked retaliation as a price
for tapping the POW labour pool. Italian holdings of British POWs were treated
fairly well, so the risk of Italian retaliation appeared low, but a German reaction
might have been different. Officials dealing with POW working hours and the
bonus plan based their decisions on British POW employment in Germany. They
suggested making the Italians accept ten-hour shifts as they would be still better
off than British POWs working eleven to seventeen hours daily in Germany.148
In other words, British officials applied the retaliation concept. They considered
their actions appropriate as long as they were not worse than those committed
by the enemy. Labour scarcity was the key driver for POW employment in
areas and under conditions prohibited by the Convention. While Germany,
Russia and Japan removed this manpower constraint by only adhering to the
institutional framework when retaliatory action was credible, Britain deployed
a slightly different strategy in this case.149 The institutional framework was not
officially breached, but bent in her favour by declaring illegal work legal. The
approval of legality pre-empted any dispute over POW mistreatment. The recent
change in Protecting Power in early 1942 worked to her advantage. Britain’s
actions received the institutional seal of approval and rebellious POWs were either
removed or tamed under a new Italian-speaking British major. The construction
of defence fortifications was secured without officially breaching the Convention.
While violation of the Geneva Convention was common during the Second
World War, the case of Scapa Flow is exceptional for three reasons. First, Britain
was one of the few major belligerents that generally respected the Geneva
Convention. Alleged cases of POW mistreatment like the shackling and Pasteur
episodes were exceptional and increased the tension between the belligerents. In
terms of POW employment, it has been suggested that Britain never committed
148 TNA, WO 32/10740, Gardner to Johnston-Burt, 11 Aug. 1942.
149 Russia and Japan had not ratified the Geneva Convention by 1939. Dear and Foot (eds), The
Oxford Companion to World War II, p. 340. Germany only selectively adhered to the Convention,




any severe breaches.150 However, the Orkney case clearly constituted a severe
breach. Second, the project was declared legal despite the violations. This
exceptional procedure confirms Moore and Fedorowich’s argument that Britain
occasionally bent the Convention’s rules. The Orkney case also shows, however,
that Britain received legal approval for a clear violation of the Convention. Third,
Britain’s efforts to retain POW labour and maximise its productivity following
the prisoners’ complaints were extraordinarily extensive, indicating the vital
military role of the barriers and the dependence on the POWs. They provided
skilled and unskilled workers who, in contrast to the civilian workers, could be
compelled to work and stay in the islands. Thus it would appear that exploiting
the Italian enemy through employment of POWs was indispensable to complete
the Churchill barriers as naval defences against the Germans.
150 Moore and Fedorowich, The British Empire, p. 226.
98
